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The Explained Award of Damocles: 
Protection or Peril in Securities 
Arbitration 
By Barbara Black and Jill Gross' 
Since 1987, when ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon! made 
arbitration of customers' disputes with their brokerage firms mandatory, 
NASD Dispute Resolution (NASD-DR), the principal securities arbitration 
forum2 and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), has institnted many reforms to improve the 
quality and fairness of the process. Some of these reforms benefit all partic-
ipants in the process because they establish clear, standardized procedures.3 
In 1999, for example, NASD adopted a discovery guide with document 
production lists setting forth presumptively discoverable documents to pro-
vide guidance to parties and arbitrators in resolving often rancorous discov-
ery disputes4 Recent NASD proposed rule changes include a rule setting 
forth procedures for the issuance of third-party subpoenas that explicitly 
provide an opportunity for parties to object to their issuances and an ambi~ 
tious project to revise the entire customers' code of arbitration procedure to 
improve its organization and clarity.6 
Many ofNASD's recent rule changes, however, are responses to the re-
ality that many customers may distrust a process that requires them to ar-
bitrate their disputes in an industry-sponsored forum. In 1998, NASD re-
placed administrative appointment of arbitrators with a procedure that 
gave the parties input into the selection of the arbitrators who would de-
cide their dispute? It also continues to propose changes to tighten the 
*The authors are Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Law, respectively, at Pace Uni-:-
versity School of Law, and Co-Directors of its Securities Arbitration Clinic. 
This article is based on a Comment Letter filed by the Pace Investor Rights Project (PIRP) 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in response to the NASD's explained 
awards proposal. See Letter from Jill I. Gross, Barbara Black, and Melanie Serkin, PIRP, to 
Jonathan Katz., Secretary, SEC, dated August 5, 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sroJ 
nasd/nasd2005032lbblack6853.pdf. The authors would like to thank the excellent research assis-
tance and insights of Melanie Serkin, a summer 2005 PIRP intern, who played a substantial role ill 
drafting that Comment Letter. 
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definition of "public" arbitrator to ensure that individuals with significant 
ties to the securities industry are not classified as "public.,,8 
NASD's proposed rule change requiring arbitrators to provide written 
explanations in arbitration awards upon the customers' request (the "ex-
plained award proposal"),9 which was published for public comment in 
July 2005, is the clearest example ofNASD's proposing a rule change in re-
sponse to investors' complaints. lO "We have found that investors want to 
know more about how a panel reaches its decision," stated NASD Chair-
man and Chief Executive Officer Robert R. Glauber in announcing the ex-
plained award proposal. I I "By giving investors the option of requiring a 
written explanation of an arbitration panel's decision, we will increase in-
vestor confidence in the fairness of the NASD arbitration process.,,12 
I. The Explained Award Proposal 
NASD's current rules require that all securities arbitration awards contain 
certain specified information, including a sununary of the issues, the damag-
es and other relief requested and awarded, and a statement of any other issues 
resolved. 13 NASD arbitrators are not required to provide reasons or explana-
tions for their award, and they typically do not provide them. 14 
Under the explained award proposal, if the customer (or an associated per-
son in an intra-industry dispute), whether as a claimant or respondent,15 re-
quests an· explained decision at least 20 days before the first scheduled hear-
ingdate/6 the arbitration panel must provide "a fact-based award stating the 
reason(s) each alleged cause of action was granted or denied.,,17 The arbitra-
tors need not include legal authorities or damages calculations as part of their 
explanation. 18 NASD explains that this would lead to "complex and lengthy 
judicial-type decisions" that would increase the time and effort needed to 
draft the decision.19 Each arbitrator will receive an additional $200 honorari-
um for writing an explained decision, and half of the additional cost will be 
allocated to the parties, as determined by the arbitrators.2o As under current 
practice, arbitrators are expected to render awards within 30 business days 
from the date the record is closed.21 Furthermore, as proposed, the customer's 
right to request an explanation does not extend to default proceedings and 
simplified arbitrations proceedings without a hearing (claims not more than 
$25,000), in light of the abbreviated nature of these proceedings.22 
In proposing this rule change, NASD does not intend to change the 
longstanding policy that arbitration awards have no precedential value.23 
To make this clear, if the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
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approves the explained decision proposal, every award will include the 
following language: "If the arbitrators have provided an explanation of 
their decision in this award, the explanation is for the inform;:ttion of the 
parties only and is not precedential in nature.,,24 
According to NASD, one of the most common complaints of partie's 
who either lose in arbitration or consider their recovery insufficient is the. 
lack of explanation for the decision.25 By giving customers the right to re-
quest an explanation, it hopes "to increase investor confidence in the fair-
ness of the NASD arbitration process.,,26 NASD acknowledges thai cuse 
tomers have more reason to be suspicious of the securities arbitration pro-
cess than do industry participants by its decision to allow only customers 
the right to require an explained decision. It explains that this is for the 
customers' protection, since they will have to balance their desire for 
more information with the increased costs, possibility of delay and risk of 
providing grounds for a court to vacate the award?? In its view, a fact-
based award stating reasons for the outcome (but not including legal au-
thorities or damages calculations) strikes the appropriate balance between 
providing disappointed customers with the information they desire withe 
out unduly increasing the length and expense of the arbitration process. 2~ 
II. Traditional Reasons for Not Requiring Awards 
It is well-settled that arbitrators are not required to explain or provide rea-
sons for their awards?9 Modem courts trace back this doctrine to Supreme 
Court dicta in Wilko v. Swan that the arbitrators' "award may be made with-
out explanation of their reasons."30 While the Court in its earlier decisions r~: 
ferred to the absence of such a requirement as evidence that arbitration was 
less protective of statutory rights than litigation? the Court since has us~4' 
the doctrine to support its holding that the absence of reasoning in an award 
alone does not provide grounds for vacatur.32 Indeed, in a few short years, the . 
Court converted the absence of explained awards from a factor proving the 
ineffectiveness of arbitration into a factor supportive of the value of arbitra.c 
tion as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. ' 
In tum, the lower federal courts have enforced the rule under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, reasoning that such a requirement would undermine the' 
very purpose of arbitration-to provide a speedy and efficient means of 
dispute resolution.33 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sobel v. Hertz, 
Warner & Co. explained that, while requiring arbitrators to explain their 
awards "would help to uncover egregious failures to apply the law;,34 parl 
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ties who choose arbitration instead "implicitly accept" the "sacrifice" of 
"legal precision" that results from the absence of the requirement.35 
The SEC acknowledged this trade-off in 1989 when it rejected a re-
quest-contained in letters filed by two advocacy groups commenting on 
a different rule proposal-that the SROs' arbitration forums adopt an ex-
plained award requirement.36 The SEC expressed its "concern" that man-
dating "written opinions at this time could slow down the arbitration pro-
cess and discourage many persons from participating as arbitrators.'m 
The SEC concluded that "[a]t present, we do not believe that the benefit 
obtained from requiring written decisions outweighs these concerns.,,38 
The SEC's carefully crafted language, of course, left open the possibility 
that it could reconsider requiring explained awards. 
The explosive growth of securities arbitration since 1989 has led to a 
number of criticisms of the current system, including the absence of 
transparency in awards. Many have expressed concern that the lack of 
reasoned awards in securities'disputes has slowed or even frozen the de-
velopment of the law governing brokers' disputes with their customers.39 
Some courts and commentators contend that the lack of reasons overly 
protects awards from judicial review,40 while others construe the lack of 
an explanation as evidence that the arbitrators disregarded the law.41 Yet 
others advocate for a written explanation only when atypical remedies are 
awarded, such as punitive damages, because they require special find-
ings.42 Finally, those on the losing side of an award-especially custom-
ers already angry at the industry for their investment losses-complain 
that the lack of an explanation frustrates their ability to understand the 
outcome and leaves them feeling that the process was unfair.43 
III. Benefits of Explained Awards 
Reforming the system to permit investors to request explained awards 
will reap benefits for arbitration participants. Written explanations will pro-
vide some insight into the arbitrators' reasons for granting an award. Par-
ties may find this beneficial for two reasons. First, if the explanation satis-
fies the investor (either because it provides insight into the panel's thought 
process or because it at least demonstrates that the arbitrators took the com-
plaint seriously), the stated purpose for the proposed rule change---to in-
crease investor confidence in the fairness of the process-may be ad-
vanced.44 The current system, it has been argued, encourages disappointed 
parties to be dissatisfied with the process and to challenge the outcome by 
attempting to vacate the award.45 In instances where an investor is deilied 
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recovery or is awarded only a small percentage of his claimed damages,46 
however, there is reason to doubt that an explanation would obviate inves-
tors' concerns about the process. Adoption of the explained award propos-
al, therefore, may be largely cosmetic if it does not improve the securitie& 
arbitration process itself, but merely claimants' perceptions of the process .. 
Second, by allowing parties to see how arbitrators previously decided' 
controversies, explanations will also provide valuable information for par~j 
ties to use when ranking and striking arbitrators during arbitrator selecti(}\l. 
in future cases. This is a tangible benefit because it will assist parties. if! ~e-: 
lecting arbitrators who they believe will be appropriate decision-makers for 
their dispute, based on the evidence provided by a panel's explanation.47 " .•.. 
Moreover, it is possible that requiring arbitrators to explain their decisions. 
will improve the quality of their decision-making .and thus lead to an overall 
improvement of the securities arbitration process, although this benefit is 
more conjectural. The process of putting an explanation on paper may IUake 
it more likely that arbitrators will evaluate carefully all the evidence and rea, 
son through their conclusions rather than decide based on compassion, bi\ls, 
or instinCt.48 In addition, cognitive psychology research suggests that people 
take greater efforts to improve the quality oftheir decision-making when tIley: 
are more likely to be held accountable for their decisions.49 Knowing that an 
explanation will increase the possibility of subjecting an award to judicial 
review50 should also encourage the panel to be more thoughtful in its awards .• 
IV. Transformation of the Securities Arbitration Process "', 
We have no doubt that the explained awards proposal, once approved,wil1 
transform securities arbitration into an even more litigation-like process: 
First, the period from filing to award willlikely be extended, possibly negat~ 
ing NASD's recent efforts to make the process more timely. NASD arbitt1l;-: 
tors might not be able to write short, dear explanations in 30 days, particular-
ly if there is an exchange of drafts among three arbitrators to pennit reyi; 
sions. 51 It has been suggested that only one arbitrator, presumably the ChaiT,' 
will write the award. While this might shorten the process, it may reduce tJi.~ 
quality of the decision-making. While NASD views delay as a Joreseea\:i1e 
cost that investors will take into account when deciding whether to request3.J1. 
explanation, investors may well be disappointed with the delay, particularl)iif, 
they do not find the outcome or the explanation satisfactory. . .. ... 
Second, while the addition of a few reasons for an award should not 
change the long-held view that arbitration awards have no precedentia,l. 
value,52 several commenters believe that an explained NASD arbitratiOJ:~': 
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award can and should be used as precedent.53 They contend that ex-
plained awards make future cases more predictable, allowing investors to 
make informed decisions, and guiding industry participants in adopting 
remedial measures. 54 The proposal's explicit declaration that awards are 
not "precedential in nature,,55 may not be sufficient to withstand this de-
velopment since the proposed rule does not prohibit attorneys or arbitra-
tors from citing past awards in future cases. Moreover, while the pro-
posed rule does not require arbitrators to cite legal authorities, it also 
does not prohibit the practice. If the practice of citing both past awards 
and legal authorities becomes commonplace, awards may come to resem-
ble opinions, despite NASD's efforts to avoid this outcome. 
Thus, attorneys, with their training to search for and apply legal prece-
dent, will find the temptation to cite awards as authority nearly irresistible. 
There is a like potential that arbitrators would accede to this practice. This 
would be an undesirable development. Arbitrators are tasked with the re-
sponsibility of deciding the dispute before them on its own facts, not with 
deciding disputes based on precedent. Moreover, creation oflaw is a legis-
lative and judicial function; it is not the role of arbitrators. Indeed, arbitra-
tors are frequently non-lawyers, with no training in analyzing the law, de-
ciding legal issues or writing legal opinions. The pool of arbitrators consists 
of "a broad cross-section of people" and there is no requirement that public 
arbitrators have any legal training or experience in the securities industry.56 
The most commonly expressed concern about arbitrators' performance is 
that the "skills and training of arbitrators are not always adequate to meet 
the challenges of contemporary securities arbitration.,,57 Most importantly, 
they are not required to apply the law. 58 It would be dangerous to allow this 
pool of arbitrators to create law in a complex industry. 
Third, written explanations will increase judicial review of the process 
and possibly make it easier for courts to apply a manifest disregard of the 
law standard. 59 Lawyers know that succinct and precise writing is diffi-
cult to achieve.6o It is more likely that "instead of being a window into the 
rationale of the arbitrators, a written explanation will be used as a plat-
form and blueprint for ... appeal, because it identifies or magnifies tar-
gets, meaningful or otherwise, for the losing party to attack.,,61 This can 
lead to prolonged and expensive litigation, again subverting the goals of a 
quick, efficient, low-cost means of dispute resolution that arbitration 
seeks to accomplish.62 Attorneys' fees and a long, drawn-out court battle 
will overwhehn small investors, in particular. Instead of providing a basis 
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for meaningful review in those rare instances of arbitrator misconduct,63 
written explanations could open the floodgates to routine judicial review; 
undermining the finality of arbitrators' awards. 
Finally, requiring arbitrators to provide explanations for their outcomes 
will likely shift-albeit subtly-the locus of their decision-making from eqc 
uity to law.64 Arbitration is considered a forum of equity, as arbitrators may 
consider "common sense notions of fairness" and other equitable factors 
when resolving disputes before them.65 This focus on equity has been a bene-
fit of securities arbitration for investors, because the law is not investorc 
friendly in many jurisdictions.66 Thus, this push towards law and away from 
equity is likely to frustrate the investor protection objectives of the proposal. 
V. Specific Objections to the Explained Award Proposal 
Since it is likely that the SEC will approve the explained awards pro-' 
posal in some form, we urge regulators to consider revising the proposal 
to remedy several specific shortcomings. 
First, to minimize the risk that participants will cite past awards as pre-
cedent, the language discouraging this practice should be strengthened. 
In an earlier version of the proposed rule, a foomote indicated that the 
template of the award would state that "the award has no precedential val-
ue and cannot be cited in any subsequent award.,,67 The current version of 
the proposed rule has diluted this language somewhat by removing the 
second half of the phrase. The text of the rule itself-not just the award: 
template--should include the precise language from the earlier version.68 
Second, some arbitrators currently on NASD's roster may be philo~' 
sophically opposed to writing explanations. The proposed rule calls for 
the request for a written explanation as late as 20 days prior to the first· 
scheduled hearing date, after NASD already has appointed arbitrators and 
when it is too late for arbitrators to decline the case. A partial solution is 
to amend the explained award proposal to require investors to indicate at. 
the time of arbitrator selection that they will request a written award. The 
rule should give the arbitrators the option to decline if they are philosoph-' 
ically opposed to explaining their decisions, or if, because of other com_ 
mitrnents,they anticipate they would not be able to write a reasoned ex~. 
planation within 30 days. Without this amendment, qualified arbitratori{ 
may drop out of the pool preemptively. . .' 
Third, the explained award proposal does not provide sufficient guidanc~ 
to arbitrators about how to craft the award. It merely defines an explainyd 
decision as a "fact-based award stating the reasons each alleged cause' of 
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action was granted or denied" and states that an explanation need not in-
chIde legal authorities or damage calculations. However, NASD does not 
require that arbitration pleadings filed in its forum contain well-pleaded, 
distinct legal causes of action, unlike pleadings filed in court. Thus, it may 
be difficult for a panel to identifY and address "each alleged cause of ac-
tion," as required by the current rule proposal. Additionally, the proposal is 
silent as to whether the explained award would have to address each and ev-
ery affirmative defense alleged by respondent( s). An award might state that 
the c!1rimant proved prima facie liability on a particular legal theory, but 
that respondent's affirmative defenses negated that liability, without identi-
fYing the alleged affirmative defense. The proposal is also ambiguous con-
cerning the extent of fact-based detail sufficient to constitute an explana-
tion .. For example, it is unclear whether a statement such as "we awarded 
MTs, Smith $24,000 because we felt sorry for her" would constitute an ade-
quate explanation. Without further clarity in any of these areas, the panel's 
"explanation" might not increase investor confidence in the process or im-
prove the quality of decision-making. 
For these reasons, we recommend that the language of the rule be 
amended to require arbitrators to address "each alleged ground for relief" 
rather than "each alleged cause of action," and also to address each al-
leged defense. We also suggest that, once approved, NASD should add a 
component to arbitrator training that specifically provides additional 
guidance to arbitrators as to how to craft an explained award within the 
meilning of the new rule. 
VI,Conclusion 
As we.have described, whether the explained awards proposal will increase 
investor protection and enhance perceptions of fairness is far from clear. We 
find it difficult to oppose a rule designed to increase transparency and options 
available to investors participating in the securities arbitration process. Since 
McMahon, reform of the securities arbitration process has focused on mak-
illg the process more judicial, and the judicial system has become the bench-
mark for fairness. This is understandable in a system where the investors' 
C()nSent to ru;bitration is fictional. 69 Yet, adding even more judicial characteris-
tics to NASD arbitrations will diminish even further the value of what used to 
be an alternative to public judging of these disputes . 
. Industry advocates of securities arbitration have long touted the pro-
cess as a worthwhile sacrifice ofIegal precision for an affordable and rel-
atively speedy forum. 70 While this is a debatable proposition with respect 
to claims where the investors' alleged losses may approach or exceed sev-
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en figures, the statement has validity with respect to small claims. We 
thus agree with NASD's position that the explained award proposal 
should not apply to simplified arbitrations, involving customer claims un-
der $25,000 that are decided on paper submissions. The advantage of a 
simplified arbitration is its low cost and expedited outcome, which would 
be vitiated if the arbitrator were required to give an explanation. More-
over, these claims are generally simple and straightforward and the out-
come should not need an explanation. If a customer in a simplified arbi-
tration feels strongly about receiving an explanation, he or she ca.n re-
quest a hearing and then request an explained award. . 
For claims beyond $25,000, does the added transparency justifY the in-
creased costs, both direct (loss of speed and increased forum fees) and in-
direct (threats to finality and equity)? The explained award proposal mliy 
be a double-edged sword: in the name of investor protection, a decreased 
emphasis on equity may lead to overdependence on a body of law that 
may not adequately protect investor rights. While we laud NASD's inves-
tor protection orientation, we are skeptical that the explained award pro-
posal will enhance the fairness of securities arbitration. . 
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